Левинас, Эммануэль, (1905-1995). Избранное: Трудная свобода: пер. с фр. — Москва: РОССПЭН, 2004 (ГУП ИПК Ульян. Дом печати). — 750 с.
Показаны сообщения с ярлыком справедливость. Показать все сообщения
Показаны сообщения с ярлыком справедливость. Показать все сообщения
пятница, 3 февраля 2023 г.
суббота, 23 апреля 2022 г.
...Справедливость к Призракам у Деррида...
Деррида, Жак. Призраки Маркса / пер. с фр. Бориса Скуратова. — Москва: Logos-altera: Левая карта, 2006. — 254 с.
четверг, 3 сентября 2015 г.
...Buchanan on Justice at Marx...
Buchanan, Allen E. (1948-). Marx and justice: The radical critique of liberalism. - Totowa (N.J.): Rowman & Allanheld, 1982. - XIV, 206 с.
пятница, 21 августа 2015 г.
среда, 15 апреля 2015 г.
Market as a mean of inequality of people by Foucault (in The Limits of Neoliberalism: An Interview with Will Davies in Management is too Important Not to Debate Blog)
"Foucault points out that the key trait of markets from a neoliberal perspective is not that they facilitate exchange but that they facilitate competition. For liberals, the market is a space of equivalence in that two people come together and perform an act of exchange. Money is equivalent to a good or a service or a unit of labour. For neoliberals, the market is something which produces inequality between people. One person wins and another person loses and that is the key moral trait of markets for them. Suddenly I realised the reason I was interested in competitiveness was precisely this issue: competition as a mode of justification. This effectively means generating more inequality and preventing the push towards equality that was a trait of the socialists, Keynesians and social democrats: projects that initially prompted the creation of the neoliberal thought collectives as a critical response."
"Foucault points out that the key trait of markets from a neoliberal perspective is not that they facilitate exchange but that they facilitate competition. For liberals, the market is a space of equivalence in that two people come together and perform an act of exchange. Money is equivalent to a good or a service or a unit of labour. For neoliberals, the market is something which produces inequality between people. One person wins and another person loses and that is the key moral trait of markets for them. Suddenly I realised the reason I was interested in competitiveness was precisely this issue: competition as a mode of justification. This effectively means generating more inequality and preventing the push towards equality that was a trait of the socialists, Keynesians and social democrats: projects that initially prompted the creation of the neoliberal thought collectives as a critical response."
среда, 18 июня 2014 г.
Property Right without Violence in Primitive Societies
Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law without Government by Bruce L. Benson
"Posner clearly demonstrated that examination of primitive legal systems from an economic perspective reveals that private sector institutions are capable of establishing strong incentives that lead to effective law making and law enforcement. Here, however, it is emphasized that the costs of violence and the benefits of order in primitive societies were enough to induce the establishment of recognized rules of conduct with emphasis on individual rights and private property-that is, the type of laws necessary for maintenance of a free market system in more complex societies. Furthermore, voluntary participatory mechanisms to enforce those rules, to adjudicate disputes, and in contrast to Posner, to allow forfurther legal growth, also developed." - АР: был ли только этот частный сектор, как мы его понимаем.
Отталкиваясь от определения права Малиновского (the rules which curb human inclinations, passions or instinctive drives; rules which protect the rights of one citizen against the concupiscence, cupidity or malice of the the other) вводит категорию "enterprise", чтобы описать современное право: "precisely because law is a purposeful enterprise that it displays structural constancies. . . The enterprise of law generates the mechanisms of enforcement, change, and dispute resolution". Это "предприятие развивается за счет существования наряду с "primary rules" еще и "secondary rules" в терминологии Харта (в The Concept of Law). "for that society to have a legal system there must be an "enterprise" that results in an authoritative enforcement mechanism, a system of dispute resolution, and presumably a means of changing rules to meet the changing needs of the society (secondary rules)". Но при этом отвергает критику Харта примитивного права, в котором якобы нет этих вторичных норм: "The claim made here and demonstrated below thatprimirive legal systems had secondary as well asprimary rules departs sharply from the conclusions reached by the legal positivist school".
Формирование частной собственности не обязательно требует органов насилия, государство, правительство. Право собственности развивается через кооперацию: "Now let us consider the actual nature of the cooperation by which property rights were defined and enforced-that is, the secondary rules that characterized the legal enterprise... These Indian tribes nevertheless had a well-developed system of private judging". Кооперация осуществляется через "rules of adjudication". And as Hart himself noted, "a system which has rules of adjudication is necessarily also committed to a rule of recognition of an elementary and imperfect sort. Преступление формируется по принципу tort. "Since there was no formalized social unit, all offenses were against the person (torts). This is an inevitable result of the procedures developed in this society, of course, since for disputes to arise and require the attention of crossers, some action by one individual had to affect another person negatively for it to be an issue of law. Actions that were clearly not of this kid, such as what a person did alone or in voluntary collaboration with other persons but in a manner that clearly did not affect or harm others, could never become subject to rules of conduct that would concern a crosser. Крайняя форма - остракизм или бойкот - и для этого кооперируется все общество. И факт, что все могут попасть под суд и суд является единственным способом разрешать споры - всех делает равными. Each member had strong incentives to provide support because at some point in the future he might find himself in a dispute and require the current disputant to reciprocate.
Необходимость правил поведения объясняет через систему социальных смыслов (то есть социальная реальность объясняется социальной реальностью), цитируя Lon Fuller: "to interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some predictable pattern". Право осуществляет matching the expectations.
При чтении о The Legal System of the Ifugao of Northern Luzon отметил, что кажется, в маленьких обществах возможен только (!) правовой дискурс. Примитивные общества, закрытые общества - поле права, там оно только и существует в чистом виде, не разрушенное никакими другими дискурсами.
В разделе The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea дает антропологическую основу формирования частной собственности: e two basic values of the Kapauku: an emphasis on individualism and on physical freed0m, nj common ownership. + The paramounts role of individual rights also was evident in the position of the tonowi as a person who had earned the admiration and respect of others in the society. He was typically "a healthy man in the prime of life" who had accumulated a good deal of wealth. The wealth accumulated by an individual in Kapauku society almost always depended on that individual's work effort and skill. + "The way in which capital is acquired and how it is used make a great difference; the natives favor rich candidates who are generous and honest. These two attributes are greatly valued by the culture. Generosity Потеря авторитета этим танови ведет к пассивному сопротивлению, просто отказу следовать за ним со стороны общества.
Этот идеал права, без насилия и одновременно вполне капиталистического, описывает со смаком. И дает свое видение права: The rules and institutions established to carry out the law appeared to be effectively designed to alleviate uncertainty, enhance efficient interactions between members of the societies, and encourage legal change as a reflection of changing needs. Пусть поищет такое право. Это примитивное право находит в современном праве, полностью девальвируя свой анализ. Потому что это совсем другое право, действующее по другим законам. more advanced, complex societies, ranging from Medieval Iceland, Ireland, and Anglo-Saxon England, to the development of the Medieval Law Merchant and its evolution into modern international commercial law,lo6 and even to the western frontier of the United States during the 1800s. The fact is that much of the law that guides today's complex American society actually evolved from or is simply a reflection of precisely the same customary law sources as those underlying the legal systems discussed above. In particular, private property rights appear to be a product of customary, not government produced, law. Market prices and institutions arise spontaneously in order to facilitate interaction. Economists should not be surprised to find that private property and legal institutions can exist without government, since their purpose is similarly to facilitate interaction.
"Posner clearly demonstrated that examination of primitive legal systems from an economic perspective reveals that private sector institutions are capable of establishing strong incentives that lead to effective law making and law enforcement. Here, however, it is emphasized that the costs of violence and the benefits of order in primitive societies were enough to induce the establishment of recognized rules of conduct with emphasis on individual rights and private property-that is, the type of laws necessary for maintenance of a free market system in more complex societies. Furthermore, voluntary participatory mechanisms to enforce those rules, to adjudicate disputes, and in contrast to Posner, to allow forfurther legal growth, also developed." - АР: был ли только этот частный сектор, как мы его понимаем.
Отталкиваясь от определения права Малиновского (the rules which curb human inclinations, passions or instinctive drives; rules which protect the rights of one citizen against the concupiscence, cupidity or malice of the the other) вводит категорию "enterprise", чтобы описать современное право: "precisely because law is a purposeful enterprise that it displays structural constancies. . . The enterprise of law generates the mechanisms of enforcement, change, and dispute resolution". Это "предприятие развивается за счет существования наряду с "primary rules" еще и "secondary rules" в терминологии Харта (в The Concept of Law). "for that society to have a legal system there must be an "enterprise" that results in an authoritative enforcement mechanism, a system of dispute resolution, and presumably a means of changing rules to meet the changing needs of the society (secondary rules)". Но при этом отвергает критику Харта примитивного права, в котором якобы нет этих вторичных норм: "The claim made here and demonstrated below thatprimirive legal systems had secondary as well asprimary rules departs sharply from the conclusions reached by the legal positivist school".
Формирование частной собственности не обязательно требует органов насилия, государство, правительство. Право собственности развивается через кооперацию: "Now let us consider the actual nature of the cooperation by which property rights were defined and enforced-that is, the secondary rules that characterized the legal enterprise... These Indian tribes nevertheless had a well-developed system of private judging". Кооперация осуществляется через "rules of adjudication". And as Hart himself noted, "a system which has rules of adjudication is necessarily also committed to a rule of recognition of an elementary and imperfect sort. Преступление формируется по принципу tort. "Since there was no formalized social unit, all offenses were against the person (torts). This is an inevitable result of the procedures developed in this society, of course, since for disputes to arise and require the attention of crossers, some action by one individual had to affect another person negatively for it to be an issue of law. Actions that were clearly not of this kid, such as what a person did alone or in voluntary collaboration with other persons but in a manner that clearly did not affect or harm others, could never become subject to rules of conduct that would concern a crosser. Крайняя форма - остракизм или бойкот - и для этого кооперируется все общество. И факт, что все могут попасть под суд и суд является единственным способом разрешать споры - всех делает равными. Each member had strong incentives to provide support because at some point in the future he might find himself in a dispute and require the current disputant to reciprocate.
Необходимость правил поведения объясняет через систему социальных смыслов (то есть социальная реальность объясняется социальной реальностью), цитируя Lon Fuller: "to interact meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some predictable pattern". Право осуществляет matching the expectations.
При чтении о The Legal System of the Ifugao of Northern Luzon отметил, что кажется, в маленьких обществах возможен только (!) правовой дискурс. Примитивные общества, закрытые общества - поле права, там оно только и существует в чистом виде, не разрушенное никакими другими дискурсами.
В разделе The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea дает антропологическую основу формирования частной собственности: e two basic values of the Kapauku: an emphasis on individualism and on physical freed0m, nj common ownership. + The paramounts role of individual rights also was evident in the position of the tonowi as a person who had earned the admiration and respect of others in the society. He was typically "a healthy man in the prime of life" who had accumulated a good deal of wealth. The wealth accumulated by an individual in Kapauku society almost always depended on that individual's work effort and skill. + "The way in which capital is acquired and how it is used make a great difference; the natives favor rich candidates who are generous and honest. These two attributes are greatly valued by the culture. Generosity Потеря авторитета этим танови ведет к пассивному сопротивлению, просто отказу следовать за ним со стороны общества.
Этот идеал права, без насилия и одновременно вполне капиталистического, описывает со смаком. И дает свое видение права: The rules and institutions established to carry out the law appeared to be effectively designed to alleviate uncertainty, enhance efficient interactions between members of the societies, and encourage legal change as a reflection of changing needs. Пусть поищет такое право. Это примитивное право находит в современном праве, полностью девальвируя свой анализ. Потому что это совсем другое право, действующее по другим законам. more advanced, complex societies, ranging from Medieval Iceland, Ireland, and Anglo-Saxon England, to the development of the Medieval Law Merchant and its evolution into modern international commercial law,lo6 and even to the western frontier of the United States during the 1800s. The fact is that much of the law that guides today's complex American society actually evolved from or is simply a reflection of precisely the same customary law sources as those underlying the legal systems discussed above. In particular, private property rights appear to be a product of customary, not government produced, law. Market prices and institutions arise spontaneously in order to facilitate interaction. Economists should not be surprised to find that private property and legal institutions can exist without government, since their purpose is similarly to facilitate interaction.
пятница, 16 августа 2013 г.
JACK REYNOLDS. Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy, and PhenomenologyJack Reynolds, Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy, and Phenomenology, Lexington Books, 2012, 281pp., $79.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780739132814.Reviewed by Marco Altamirano, Louisiana State University
Justice in Rawls and Derrida: Rawls insists that the principles of justice as fairness must attain a reflective equilibrium, Derrida contends that justice is always that which disrupts any equilibrium.
Derridian deconstruction of the Law: Needs to invent the law, for otherwise we could simply get a computer to dispense judicial punishments, paying no attention to the singularity of the participants and the event of transgression. In an important sense, a judge needs to exceed the letter of the law in order to be just, and this is the case even where mercy provisions are themselves enshrined in law, because those particular supplements to the law are also permanently susceptible to revision. At the same time, it remains the case that a judge cannot completely ignore the law, but must negotiate this tension and must, as Derrida enigmatically suggests, "negotiate the unnegotiable.". . . There is no end to this deconstruction, however, and justice does not arrive.
Phenomenologic time through body concepts - bodily equilibrium and skillful coping: The third part of Chronopathologies presents some conceptual resources for thinking of a pragmatic and embodied time drawn from figures in the phenomenological tradition such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Dreyfus. Reynolds seems at home discussing the tendency of the body toward equilibrium through a procedure that Dreyfus calls "skillful coping" (169). In a particularly illuminating example of an expert cricketer, Reynolds shows the remarkable adequacy of phenomenology to account for the living present that constitutes the expert poise of the professional athlete. There is neither a question of reflection or calculative reasoning, nor a question of an other-worldly disruptive future, in the urgent moment when the batsman is confronting a fast bowler. Such a moment is constituted, rather, by an embodied retention of the past and an embodied anticipation of the future. Further, such a model of skillful coping can be extended to diverse fields of human behavior to the benefit of ethical and political analysis. Finally, Reynolds contends that this pervasive phenomenon reveals the primary orientation we have toward an embodied calibration of equilibrium within our environment (prior to present-based calculative reasoning or some disruptive future intervening upon the present). Reynolds complains that, unfortunately, the embodied living present of phenomenology is devalued by the future orientation of Deleuze and Derrida. Deleuze encourages experimentation, problematic encounters, and the compulsory apprenticeship in learning how to swim, for example, over the calm mastery of the cricket player (195), and Derrida similarly neglects the body and shuns the value of practical experience (205-210). But while skillful coping and bodily equilibrium are promising areas of research for political and ethical philosophy, these areas are best explored through phenomenological analyses of the living present. Thus, by not according a central position to the lived time of the body, poststructuralism (future time) and analytic philosophy (clock time) alike are deprived of a temporality of massive service to ethical and political philosophy. Finally and most of all, the lived time of phenomenology avoids prioritizing one time or another, but represents an integrated balance of times: calculative, anticipatory, disruptive, and aporetic times all have their place within lived time, which embodies, as it were, all of them. The phenomenological analysis of the body, Reynolds concludes, functions as a kind of Aristotelian mean capable of moderating the extremes of poststructuralism and analytic philosophy (229).
Justice in Rawls and Derrida: Rawls insists that the principles of justice as fairness must attain a reflective equilibrium, Derrida contends that justice is always that which disrupts any equilibrium.
Derridian deconstruction of the Law: Needs to invent the law, for otherwise we could simply get a computer to dispense judicial punishments, paying no attention to the singularity of the participants and the event of transgression. In an important sense, a judge needs to exceed the letter of the law in order to be just, and this is the case even where mercy provisions are themselves enshrined in law, because those particular supplements to the law are also permanently susceptible to revision. At the same time, it remains the case that a judge cannot completely ignore the law, but must negotiate this tension and must, as Derrida enigmatically suggests, "negotiate the unnegotiable.". . . There is no end to this deconstruction, however, and justice does not arrive.
Phenomenologic time through body concepts - bodily equilibrium and skillful coping: The third part of Chronopathologies presents some conceptual resources for thinking of a pragmatic and embodied time drawn from figures in the phenomenological tradition such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Dreyfus. Reynolds seems at home discussing the tendency of the body toward equilibrium through a procedure that Dreyfus calls "skillful coping" (169). In a particularly illuminating example of an expert cricketer, Reynolds shows the remarkable adequacy of phenomenology to account for the living present that constitutes the expert poise of the professional athlete. There is neither a question of reflection or calculative reasoning, nor a question of an other-worldly disruptive future, in the urgent moment when the batsman is confronting a fast bowler. Such a moment is constituted, rather, by an embodied retention of the past and an embodied anticipation of the future. Further, such a model of skillful coping can be extended to diverse fields of human behavior to the benefit of ethical and political analysis. Finally, Reynolds contends that this pervasive phenomenon reveals the primary orientation we have toward an embodied calibration of equilibrium within our environment (prior to present-based calculative reasoning or some disruptive future intervening upon the present). Reynolds complains that, unfortunately, the embodied living present of phenomenology is devalued by the future orientation of Deleuze and Derrida. Deleuze encourages experimentation, problematic encounters, and the compulsory apprenticeship in learning how to swim, for example, over the calm mastery of the cricket player (195), and Derrida similarly neglects the body and shuns the value of practical experience (205-210). But while skillful coping and bodily equilibrium are promising areas of research for political and ethical philosophy, these areas are best explored through phenomenological analyses of the living present. Thus, by not according a central position to the lived time of the body, poststructuralism (future time) and analytic philosophy (clock time) alike are deprived of a temporality of massive service to ethical and political philosophy. Finally and most of all, the lived time of phenomenology avoids prioritizing one time or another, but represents an integrated balance of times: calculative, anticipatory, disruptive, and aporetic times all have their place within lived time, which embodies, as it were, all of them. The phenomenological analysis of the body, Reynolds concludes, functions as a kind of Aristotelian mean capable of moderating the extremes of poststructuralism and analytic philosophy (229).
понедельник, 24 июня 2013 г.
пятница, 7 июня 2013 г.
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